(a) It would carry no international guarantee. A decision of the Indian government today could be cancelled, whetted down, or divergently interpreted tomorrow. Even an amendment of the Indian Constitution would be liable to repeal or revision by the Indian legislature.

 (b) It has been tried in Kashmir's earlier experience and it is has failed to provide a solution. From 1947 to 1953, India's supporters in Kashmir, though a minority, made much of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, claiming that the special status for Kashmir conferred by it amounted to freedom from interference by the Indian federal government in Kashmir's internal affairs. This assertion was vehemently opposed by another section of India's supporters, the Dogra community in Jammu. A heated controversy ensued: the main casualty was Shaikh Abdullah, who was flaunting an accord with Nehru as reinforcing Article 370. He was put in jail and, during his imprisonment and afterwards, a series of ordinances and other enactments converted Kashmir into another state of the Indian Union with the sole restriction that Indian citizens could not purchase land in Kashmir. This sole restriction itself has been very logically challenged by Indian citizens and leaders.

(c) This was not a fortuitous development. The Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of Article 370, had stated in the Indian parliament that its provisions would "erode" in course of time.

(d) Nehru's confessed anticipation stemmed from a good perception of the working of the Indian Union. That perception is still valid. When one constituent unit of a federation is given a special status, other units naturally look askance at it and at least some of them will tend to demand the same for themselves. The stress can be averted either by encroaching on the status  in order to make it only nominal or by eliminating it altogether.

(e) Even a new conception of an autonomous region within India, different from a state of the Indian Union with a special status, would keep Kashmir under subjection to India. In the vital matters of  defence, external affairs (including external trade) and communications. It would perpetuate the unnatural severance of its links with Pakistan.

(f) After the campaign of mass slaughter and destruction which India has conducted in Kashmir since 1990 and which had reached genocidal proportions, any dispensation which allows the stationing of Indian troops in Kashmir is bound to be repugnant to popular sentiment. Even if a section of them were to accept it, others would repudiate it; the dispute would  continue to fester.

 These considerations lead to the conclusion that any solution of the Kashmir dispute is pure moonshine which

 (a) rests only on the good faith of the Indian government, liable to change from one administration to another, even if it is solemnly conveyed to another government;

 (b) does not contemplate an ascertainment of the popular will without coercion, intimidation or undue influence;

 (c) does not result from a negotiating process with the participation of Kashmir's representatives.