India recognized Israel in 1952 and a year later Israel opened its consulate in Bombay. Military cooperation between the two countries, however, commenced in 1962, when having suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chinese, India decided to modernize its armed forces. In addition to tapping traditional sources Nehru approached Israel as well for military hardware. Tel Aviv obliged by supplying guns, ammunition and small arms.

A few years later, India and Israel signed a secret pact, which included training of armed forces personnel, joint military exercises and supply of spare parts for India’s weapons. India’s Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Satish Kumar Sareen and APJ Abul Kalam, the father of India’s missile program, visited Israel in the middle of 1996, where they discussed the possibility of integrating the military technology gained by Israel and India. Kalam showed an interest in the installation of a global positioning system in the MiG 21 aircraft. India obtained thermal imaging sights for the T 72 tanks from Israel. Other areas in which India was interested was electronic warfare, in particular Kalam wanted to know more about Israel’s anti-ballistic missile program.

This was followed by a series of high-level visits from Israel to India. President of Israel, Erza Wiezman visited New Delhi in 1997. It resulted among other agreements, in furthering the on-going military cooperation between them. Israeli companies got contracts for the purchase of two fast patrol boats. Israel reportedly offered its advanced multi-mode maritime surveillance radar to the Indian navy and the surface to air Barak missile system. Shimon Perez; Chief of the Israeli Defense forces, General David Shelteof and Moshe Dayan also visited India during that period.

India continues to increase its defense expenditure yearly and despite abject poverty it diverts its resources to the procurement of military hardware from all possible sources including that from Israel. The two countries have maintained covert military relations for decades, which included the purchase of sophisticated defense equipment. Tel Aviv is now the second largest supplier of arms to India, after Russia.

The United States had initially hesitated to allow Israel to export state-of-the-art weapons of US origin to other countries. But despite Pakistan providing unstinted support to Washington in its war on terror, the Bush administration has given the green light to Israel to provide three US funded Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control System, to India, costing $1 billion. Asia Society President, Nicholas Platt, had no comments on Israel and India entering into a nuclear-related arms deal but warned Pakistan, in his recent keynote address in Islamabad, not to enter into “dangerous nuclear commerce with North Korea”.

Phalcon is an Israeli developed long-range radar and will be mounted on a Russian Ilyushin 96 cargo plane. It can detect targets 800 kilometres away and direct its own aircraft on to 60 targets at a time. It will be a force multiplier for the Indian armed forces. What will alter the strategic balance, however, will be the acquisition of the “Silent Sentry”, i.e. Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) from Israel.

India, though an ally of Russia, has not objected to the United States establishing a missile defense shield though, that amounts to a violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972 between the Soviet Union and the United States. This is so because India itself plans on having an ABM system at some future date. The Arrow 2, however, is not yet a fully reliable anti-ballistic missile system. Many more trials have to be carried out and more research has to be undertaken to make it foolproof in battlefield conditions. The best India can achieve in the near future is point defense of some critical areas. A policy of national defense against missiles is not possible in the foreseeable future. It will simply be too expensive even for India.

The radar may be able to pick up the launching of the missile at the takeoff stage but intercepting the missile in the Indo-Pakistan context may not be all that successful. Unlike in the case of Russia and the United States, which are thousands of miles away from each other, the time of flight from the launching pad in Pakistan to targets in India is very short. It will not be easy for the Arrow to pick up the missile at the takeoff stage. Any interception will, therefore, be above Indian territory. The nuclear radiation and blast will affect Indian citizens even when the incoming missile is destroyed before it reaches the target.

Pakistan has so far confined itself to expressing its deep concern about the growing Indo-Israel defense cooperation but much more has to be done to prevent the downgrading of our minimum nuclear deterrent in the light of these two acquisitions by India from Israel.

President Musharraf in a recent interview with BBC did mention that Pakistan had to keep nuclear parity with India not perhaps in numbers but in the effectiveness of its minimum nuclear deterrent. That will be disturbed if India acquires an anti-ballistic missile system. Time for a nuclear showdown has indeed been passed with the reduction of tension between the two countries. Blaming each other for supporting terrorism, however, continues despite the recent people-to-people contact. This can raise the tempo once more bringing the two countries once again to the brink of war.

The three requirements for a nuclear deterrent are capability, credibility and survivability. The Phalcon and the Arrow 2 would not affect our credibility to use the nuclear weapon as a last resort. It will not affect the survivability of our nuclear assets as the ABM system is defensive in nature but it will reduce our capability to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy. It could, therefore, lower the confidence of our operational planners.

Ideally both India and Pakistan must work towards a nuclear free zone in South Asia. But the ground realities are that the atomic devices are here to stay and India would continue to enlarge its nuclear capabilities. What are the options for Pakistan to maintain its minimum nuclear deterrent? One option is to increase the size of the cake so that the present share for defense and for economic development is enhanced. If that is not possible in the near future while remaining within our resources Pakistan can take certain measures to prevent its nuclear deterrent being downgraded by the induction of the ABM system.

What are the options for Pakistan to maintain its minimum nuclear deterrent? Pakistan may have to place greater reliance on strategic bombers. Use shorter-range ballistic missiles to reduce the time of flight. Decoys could be launched to confuse the ABM. Using missiles in mass also could put the anti-ballistic missile off target. More accurate intelligence would be needed to locate ABMs deployed by India. Clandestine methods could be used to destroy the radar and the launchers on the ground. Reloading of the ABMs takes time and a window of opportunity will open which would be utilized to penetrate the nuclear shield.

Pakistan must continue to tell the United States that the induction of the ABM by India will alter the strategic balance in South Asia and would compel Pakistan to enhance its nuclear capability. The Pakistan-USA Defense Consultative Group, which meets regularly, can also be apprised of the dangers that lie ahead because of the feverish attempts by India to enhance its military capabilities. Pakistan should keep its time-tested ally in the picture.

Of course a much deeper analysis would be needed and a more serious thought has to be given by those who have the expertise and are charged with the responsibility of ensuring our security against a more powerful enemy. I am sure the NCA would be discussing ways and means of maintaining our minimum deterrent even when India acquires the Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile system from Israel.